# DA- Flag Burning

## 1NC

#### A new CNA report predicts that the military recruiting environment is about to go downhill.

**Wagner 2/18** The Military Could Soon Face Increased Recruiting Challenges By BRIAN WAGNER on February 18, 2016 http://taskandpurpose.com/the-military-could-soon-face-increased-recruiting-challenges/

After more than a half-decade operating in a favorable recruiting environment that allowed **the U.S. military** to be increasingly selective and to meet most recruitment goals, the new environment **is “likely to become significantly less** fertile **in the near future**,” according to a [new summary report released](https://www.cna.org/news/releases/2016-02-10" \t "_blank) by CNA. “Population Representation in the Military Services” is **CNA’s annual** congressionally mandated **study** of the demographic makeup of the personnel serving in the U.S. military. This year’s report, released on Feb. 10, pins 2014 — the most recent year for which data is available — as a turning point in which the increasingly strong civilian labor market and declining Department of Defense budget **begin to erode the bargaining position of recruiters interacting with American young adults**. The report warns the DoD that “**without sufficient planning and resources, military recruiting will be characterized by ‘boom and bust’ periods**, as has been the case in past years.” The downsides of increased volatility in recruiting are plentiful, including higher recruiting costs and the potential to recruit lower-quality service members. **RELATED: 5 TIPS FOR RECRUITING HIPSTERS INTO THE MILITARY »** CNA researchers note that a strong economy and smaller recruiting budget is leading to a talent pool that is shrinking faster than the military is downsizing. Since 2009, there have been a decreasing number of applicants for each enlisted position available across the services. Over the last 30 years, notes CNA, approximately 60% of all non-prior service, or NPS, applicants for enlisted positions have been accepted by the military; today, applicants have a 70% chance of being accepted. CNA notes that even though **the military** has largely met recruiting goals in recent years, it **no longer has much margin for error**, and as a result “should expect NPS recruit quality to fall.”

#### Flag Burning on campuses dissuades people from joining the military by passing on a negative stigma and hurts recruitment. Cmoy 08

Wounded Marine Conquers Berkeley cmoy | Friday Feb 15, 2008 3:01 AM http://humanevents.com/2008/02/15/wounded-marine-conquers-berkeley/

**The standoff between pro-troop folks** **and anti-war anarchists** closed down a part of Berkeley on Tuesday and early Wednesday morning. Prior to Tuesday’s meeting, folks from across the United States sent almost 30,000 emails to the City Council; with the tally running 15 to 1 against the council’s shameful actions. Move America Forward also collected over 23,000 signatures on a petition condemning Berkeley’s actions. **Thousands of Marine supporters and anti-war activists clashed** in Martin Luther King Park, across from the City Council chambers. Move America Forward (MAF) had permits for the space, but Code Pink and their supporters invaded the space and attacked patriots with skateboards, signs, rocks, and bullhorns. **Police made no arrests of the aggressors early on and stood by as the attacks continued.** Anarchy reigned. Multiple pleas from MAF for police protection went unanswered. Even the California Highway Patrol refused to help. **Anti-war protesters set a flag on fire** that also burned a city sign that said “Peace Wall.” Two bikes, one of a child, also burned in the fire. **The “peace” protesters stole flags from patriots and then set them aflame**. Early Wednesday morning after hours of fighting, **screaming and flag burning by the anti-war side**, the council agreed to rescind its request for the city manager’s office to send the offending letter calling the Marines “intruders.” But the council refused to apologize to the Marines, or to rescind its gifts of public funds to a special interest group, Code Pink, which has given over $600,000 in aid to the families of Islamic terrorists. **The group will continue to harass Marine recruiters in Berkeley**, and they will do so with both the blessing and encouragement of the Berkeley City Council. Council members Betty Olds and Gordon Wozniak were the sole shining lights among the council. Despite **their opposition to the war in Iraq**, they recognized that the council had wrongly chosen to attack not a policy, but the people who put on the uniform of the United States military. Olds and Wozniak pleaded with their fellow council members to support them in a resolution that would apologize to the Marines and others for the brouhaha that got worldwide media attention. “We insulted the Marines and they deserve an apology,” Wozniak said. “At this point, the issue is not the war. The issue is what the Berkeley City Council did. We failed our city.” The behavior of both city officials and far-left radicals stunned and hurt veterans. Vietnam veteran Rod Ferroggiaro of Fairfield, Calif., couldn’t believe what he saw in Berkeley on Tuesday. “Facing this group was an assortment of old hippies dressed in pink reliving the antiwar years of the sixties – the same ones who spat on us when I returned to California from my first tour of duty in Vietnam in 1965,” Ferroggiaro said. “The frightening people were the young . . . dressed in black shirts with orange bandanas. They were cursing and running into Blue Star moms and veterans with skateboards. “They would get face to face with an older man or woman and chest-bump them trying to provoke an altercation. I **saw one rip an American flag from a 46-year-old Blue Star mom and later set it on fire,” he said. “This was all witnessed by the Berkeley police, who did nothing to stop these radicals. Later I learned that they were Berkeley** High School **students who were brought there by their teachers.”** There will be no apologies to Marine Eamon Kelly or Vietnam veteran Rob Ferroggiaro, but across the nation reasonable Americans are letting it be known that they are not alone in their protests against the Berkeley council. Lawmakers at the state and federal level are pushing legislation to take more than $5 million in earmarks for Berkeley. Groups around the country are boycotting Berkeley, and businesspeople have said they will close shops or refuse doing business in that liberal city. “**The action by the Berkeley City Council indicates that they have a disdain for and do not appreciate Marines for what they do and have done for this country**, our democracy, and our freedoms,” said Rep. John Campbell, who is introducing the Semper Fi Act in the U.S. house. “If they have so little respect and understanding of that, there is no reason for the rest of us, outside the city of Berkeley, to subsidize their actions with our taxpayer funds,” Campbell said Thursday. California Assemblyman Guy Houston has also introduced legislation that would strip Berkeley of millions of dollars of state transportation funds since the city has given the parking space in front of the Marine Recruiting Station to Code Pink with the request that the Marxist organization use it **to “impede… the work of any military recruiting office** located in the City of Berkeley.”

#### Recruitment is key to readiness—necessary for US military effectiveness. Kosiak 08

Steven M. Kosiak, Vice President for Budget Studies at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, frequent speaker on defense issues, providing expert testimony before House and Senate Committees, and has been published in multiple major newspapers, “Military Manpower for the Long Haul,” CSBA Publication, 2008

For more than half a century, the US military has been well known for developing and employing the most advanced weapon systems in the world. However, over the years, perhaps nothing has contributed more to the effectiveness of the US military than the quality of its personnel. Indeed, in order to be effective, the US military must have adequate numbers of high-quality military personnel, with the right experience, training and skills. Military manpower requirements can be successfully met only if adequate re- sources are provided for recruitment and retention efforts, including appropriate types and levels of compensation. In addition, success depends on less easily quan- tifiable elements such as effective leadership and intangible but important factors including high morale and the relative success of ongoing military operations. It also requires effective long-term planning. First, because it takes considerable time to produce quality military personnel; and, second, because the military is a closed sys- tem that—with few exceptions—promotes only from within. The US military faces a range of serious challenges to its ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of quality personnel both in the near term and over the long term. The most critical near-term challenge is related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But these ongoing operations are not the only manpower-related prob- lems confronting the US military. Among other things, those challenges include: Trends in various areas of military technology and concepts of operations that will, over time, likely require that the Services acquire and maintain an increasingly competent, well-trained and well-educated workforce. Obstacles within the Services’ traditional personnel and management cultures that may stand in the way of using the most cost-effective recruitment and reten- tion tools, and creating a more flexible and effective personnel management and compensation system. High and growing budgetary costs associated with military personnel (including the cost of pay and, especially, healthcare and retiree benefits), and the danger that increasing personnel costs may crowd out needed investments in the development and procurement of new weapon systems. Taken together, these and other trends and challenges make it imperative that the Services’ personnel requirements be managed effectively in coming years. Doing so is likely to require both using traditional tools of personnel management (e.g., pay, bo- nuses and recruiting resources) more efficiently and adopting a mix of broader, and in some cases, new and innovative approaches (e.g., restructuring military compensa- tion, and reorienting the military to focus more attention and resources on preparing for stability operations).

#### Readiness prevents great power war and existential governance crises. Startfor ‘13

Stratfor 13. "The Virtues Of Hard Power." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 22 May 2013. Web. 15 July 2013. Stratfor is a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world.PL

Hard power has not been in vogue since the Iraq War turned badly in about 2004. In foreign policy journals and at elite conferences, the talk for years has been about “soft power,” “the power of persuasion” and the need to revitalize the U.S. State Department as opposed to the Pentagon: didn’t you know, it’s about diplomacy, not military might! Except when it isn’t; except when members of this same elite argue for humanitarian intervention in places like Libya and Syria. Then soft power be damned. **The fact is that hard power is supremely necessary in today’s world, for reasons having nothing to do with humanitarian intervention**. **Indeed, the Harvard professor and former government official, Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,** who, in 2004, actually coined the term “soft power” in an eponymous book, has always been subtle enough in his own thinking to realize how relevant hard power remains. As I write, **the two areas of the world that are most important in terms of America’s long-term economic and political interests — Asia and Europe — are undergoing power shifts. The growth of Chinese air and naval power is beginning to rearrange the correlation of forces in Asia, while the weakening of the European Union in geopolitical terms – because of its ongoing fiscal crisis — is providing an opportunity for a new Russian sphere of influence to emerge in Central and Eastern Europe**. Of course, both challenges require robust diplomacy on America’s part. But **fundamentally what they really require is a steadfast commitment of American hard power**. And the countries in these two most vital regions are not bashful about saying so**. Security officials in countries as diverse as Japan and Poland, Vietnam and Romania desperately hope that all this talk about American soft power overtaking American hard power is merely that — talk. For it is American warships and ground forces deployments that matter most to these countries and their officials**. Indeed, despite the disappointing conclusions to the Iraq and Afghanistan wars**, rarely before has American hard power been so revered in places that actually matter**. Asia is the world’s demographic and economic hub, as well as the region where the great sea lines of communication coalesce. And unless China undergoes a profound political and economic upheaval — of a degree not yet on the horizon — the Middle Kingdom will present the United States with its greatest 21st century competitor**. In the face of China’s military rise, Japan is shedding its quasi-pacifistic orientation and adopting a positive attitude toward military expansion. In a psychological sense, Japan no longer takes the American air and naval presence in Northeast Asia for granted**. It actively courts American hard power in the face of a territorial dispute with China over islands in the East China Sea. **Japan knows that, ultimately, it is only American hard power that can balance against China in the region. For South Korea, too, American hard power is critical**. **Though the South Korean military can ably defend itself against North Korea’s, again, it is America’s air and naval presence in the region that provides for a favorable balance of power that defends Seoul against Pyongyang and its ally in Beijing**. **As for Taiwan, its very existence as a state depends on the American military’s Pacific presence. Don’t tell officials in the Philippines that American hard power is any less relevant than in previous decades. Like Japan, after years of taking the U.S. Navy and Air Force for granted, Manila is literally desperate for American military support and presence against China, with which it disputes potentially resource-rich islands and geographical features in the South China Sea**. Like Japan and South Korea, the Philippines is a formal treaty ally of the United States: that is to say, these countries matter. As for Taiwan, it is arguably one of the finest examples of a functioning democracy in the world beyond the West, as well as geopolitically vital because of its position on the main sea lines of communication. Thus, Taiwan too, matters greatly. Vietnam, for its part, has emerged as a critical de facto ally of the United States. It is the single most important Southeast Asian country preventing China’s domination of the strategically crucial South China Sea. And what is Vietnam doing? It is refitting Cam Ranh Bay as a deep-water harbor, officially to attract navies from India, Russia and elsewhere; but especially to attract the U.S. Navy. Malaysia plays down its close relationship with the United States, as part of a delicate diplomatic minuet to get along with both China and the Muslim world. Nevertheless, the number of visits of American warships to Malaysian ports has jumped from three annually in 2003 to well over 50. As for Singapore, one of its diplomats told me: “We see American hard power as benign. **The U.S. Navy defends globalization by protecting the sea lanes, which we, more than any other people, benefit from**. To us, there is nothing dark or conspiratorial about the United States and its vast security apparatus.” In 1998, the Singaporeans built Changi Naval Base solely to host American nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines. In 2011, there were 150 American warship visits to Singapore. Then there are the four American littoral combat ships that, it was announced in 2011, would be stationed in Singapore. At the other end of Eurasia, whatever their public comments, diplomats from countries in Central and Eastern Europe are worried about any American shift away from hard power. In the 1990s, the security situation looked benevolent to them. They were in the process of joining NATO and the European Union, even as Russia was weakened by chaos under Boris Yeltsin’s undisciplined rule. Following centuries of interminable warfare, they were finally escaping history, in other words. **Now NATO and the European Union — so vigorous and formidable in the 1990s – look fundamentally infirm. Meanwhile, Russia has been, for the moment, revitalized through a combination of natural gas revenues and Vladimir Putin‘s dynamic authoritarianism-lite**. **Russia once again beckons on the doorstep of Europe, and the Poles, Romanians and others are scared. Forget NATO. With declining defense budgets of almost all European member states, NATO is to be taken less and less seriously.** The **Poles, Romanians and so on now require unilateral U.S. hard power**. For years already, the Poles and Romanians have been participating in U.S. military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq and sub-Saharan Africa. They have been doing so much less because they actually believe in those missions, but in order to prove their mettle as reliable allies of the United States — so that the United States military will be there for them in any future hour of need. As for the Middle East**, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf** countries **all** desperately require U.S. hard power**: If not specifically for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, then certainly** in order to promote a balance of power unfavorable to Iran’s regional hegemony**.** Soft power became a trendy concept in the immediate wake of America’s military overextension in Iraq and Afghanistan. **But soft power was properly meant as a critical accompaniment to hard power and as a shift in emphasis away from hard power, not as a replacement for it. Hard power is best employed not when America invades a country with its ground troops but when it daily projects military might over vast swaths of the earth, primarily with air and naval assets, in order to protect U.S. allies, world trade and a liberal maritime order. American hard power, thus, must never go out of fashion.**

## 2NC

### AT Heg Bad (Top Level)

#### 1. The pursuit of heg is inevitable – it’s just a question of effectiveness. Tellis ’09,

Tellis, senior associate at Carnegie, 9 — Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace specializing in international security, defense and Asian strategic issues, Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR—the National Bureau of Asian Research, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, 2009 (“Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States,” Global Asia, Volume 4, Number 1, Available Online at http://globalasia.org/pdf/issue9/Ashley\_J.\_Tellis.pdf, Accessed 09-13-2011, p. 54-55) recut from Woodward

This hegemony is by no means fated to end any ¶ time soon, however, given that the United States ¶ remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the ¶ United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future ¶ will thus remain an issue of concern both within ¶ the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the ¶ juvenescence of the United State’s “unipolar ¶ moment,” combined with the disorientation ¶ produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to ¶ restrain any premature generalization that the ¶ imperial activism begun by the clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took ¶ to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some ¶ way come to define the permanent norm of US ¶ behavior in the global system. In all probability, ¶ it is much more likely that the limitations on US ¶ ¶ power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will ¶ produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite ¶ the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a ¶ preponderance of power, neutralize threatening ¶ challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals ¶ that go back to the foundations of the republic — ¶ is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon.¶ Precisely because the desire for dominance is ¶ likely to remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to ¶ the Bush years — the central task facing the next ¶ administration will still pertain fundamentally ¶ to the issue of US power. This concern manifests ¶ itself through the triune challenges of: redefining ¶ the United States’ role in the world, renewing the ¶ foundations of US strength, and recovering the ¶ legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the next ¶ administration faces the central task of clarifying ¶ the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the ¶ material foundations of its power, and securing ¶ international support for its policies.

#### That non-uniques all of their evidence, multiple warrants

#### A. Their systems compare a multi-polar world to unipolar one with no warrant for why we’d transition away from a unipolar system. The aff doesn’t strengthen or weaken heg, but simply makes it more effective at resolving and preventing within a unipolar system.

#### B. Their evidence is based on perception, i.e. that the United States will receive backlash for its position of power, but that’s non-unique because the aff changes nothing about the push for US power, means they’re non-unique. Squo uses current focus on military so they have no impact.

#### 2. Their evidence identifies the need for the aff – their impacts are based on studies of declining hegemonies that are no longer strong enough to maintain peace, aff ensures effective military and avoids the impacts of their evidence.

#### The two arguments above are high-level, winning either of those disproves the entirety of the link to their heg cards – the rest of the arguments are even if they prove a link.

#### 3. The US won’t give up the crown- we’ll go down fighting triggering all their impacts- hegemony critics agree. Calleo ‘9,

David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) 2009 “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy” p. 4-5

It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and suppress our hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as our identity as a nation is intimately bound up with seeing ourselves as the world’s most powerful country, at the heart of a global system, hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession of our official imagination, the id´ee fixe of our foreign policy. America’s hegemonic ambitions have, after all, suffered severe setbacks before. Less than half a century has passed since the “lesson of Vietnam.” But that lesson faded without forcing us to abandon the old fantasies of omnipotence. The fantasies merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, in its collapse, the Soviet Union proved to be a greater danger to America’s own equilibrium than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are scarcely a rarity – among individuals or among nations. “Reality” is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesize old and new images, concepts, and ideas and fuse language with emotions – all according to the inner grammar of our minds. These synthetic constructions become our reality, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.

#### 4. A decline in heg would trigger drastic measures from the White House – means even if the aff is a bad idea, declining heg now would cause more extremist policies to attempt to maintain heg. Gottileb 12

Gottlieb 9/19—adjunct professor of International Affairs and Public Policy at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, two MA degrees and a PhD in international relations from Columbia (Stuart, 9/19/12, “What if U.S. stops policing the world?,” http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html, RBatra)

But the question is not whether promises to bring home troops and reduce military spending can be sold in an election year -- the question is what impact would retrenchment have on future U.S. and global security. If history is any guide, the answer is troubling: Over the past century, each of America's attempts to reduce its role in the world was met by rising global threats, eventually requiring a major U.S. re-engagement.¶ This is not to argue that the U.S. should sustain its muscular post-9/11 global posture or continue its land war in Afghanistan. It is to urge caution against a growing belief that scaling back American power in the world will be without risks or costs.¶ History shows that in the aftermath of America's major wars of the 20th century -- World War I, World War II and Vietnam -- the American public and powerful leaders in Washington demanded strict new limits in foreign policy. After World War I, that meant rejecting participation in the League of Nations and receding into isolation. After World War II, it meant embarking on one of the largest voluntary military demobilizations in world history. And after Vietnam, it meant placing new restrictions on a president's ability to conduct overseas operations.¶ But in each case, hopes were soon dashed by global challengers who took advantage of America's effort to draw back from the world stage -- Germany and Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the immediate post-World War II period and the Soviet Union again after Vietnam. In each case, the United States was forced back into a paramount global leadership role -- in World War II, the Cold War and the military build-up and proxy wars of the 1980s.¶ Similar effects have also followed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from global hot spots, as in Somalia in 1993. America's need to extricate itself from that calamitous humanitarian mission, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, was clear. But the withdrawal came at a huge strategic cost: It emboldened the narrative of the emerging al Qaeda network that America was a "paper tiger," setting the stage for the escalating terrorist attacks of the 1990s and September 11, 2001.¶ Obama's desire to withdraw from costly and unpopular foreign conflicts and refocus on domestic issues is understandable. And he is by no means an isolationist, as his intensified war on al Qaeda can attest.¶ But Obama's assertion that his recalibration of U.S. foreign policy -- centered on withdrawing U.S. troops from Mideast wars and leaning more on allies and the United Nations -- has awakened "a new confidence in our leadership" is without foundation.¶ Like Great Britain in the 19th century, America since the turn of the 20th century has been the world's pivotal global power. Fair or not, in moments when America seemed unsure of its role in the world, the world noticed and reacted.¶ There is no reason to believe now is different. Indeed, in many ways looming opportunists are more obvious today than the 1930s, 1970s and 1990s. These include al Qaeda and other Islamist movements spinning U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan as strategic defeats; an emboldened Iran on the cusp of attaining nuclear weapons; and a rising China flexing its muscles in the South China Sea.

### AT Heg Bad (Disease)

#### 1. Hegemony is key to prevent disease – that would disproportionately affect the non-western world – overwhelms rudimentary healthcare system. Meier ’10,

Meier ’10 – Asst. Professor of Global Health Policy @ UNC Chapel Hill (Benjamin Mason, The Obama Administration’s Global Health Initiative: Public Health Law, U.S. Foreign Policy & Universal Human Rights, Public Health Law, 2010)

Global health is fast becoming an explicit goal of U.S. policy – with legislation, regulations, and policy statements guiding our funding, activities, and programs to address public health abroad. At the intersection of foreign policy and health policy, this global health imperative for public health law is poised to grow under the Obama Administration’s Global Health Initiative. With contemporary institutions of global health governance now over 60 years old, the nature of the global health architecture has changed considerably as the United States has shifted its global health priorities.[i] As a leading progenitor of the global health governance framework, the United States has long sought a place for global health policy to alleviate suffering in an increasingly interconnected world. However, with U.S. policymakers harboring suspicions that global governance would advance “socialized medicine” in the midst of the Cold War, the United States constrained international organizations to medical “impact projects” that would advance U.S. foreign policy interests.[ii] Despite fleeting U.S. support for global health policy in the 1970s,[iii] the 1980 election of President Reagan—and with it, principled opposition to international organizations—would limit opportunities for global health governance.[iv] Given a growing leadership vacuum in global health, the global health architecture began to shift toward greater U.S. hegemony in global health policy, with scholars increasingly noting that “the U.S. domestic agenda is driving the global agenda.”[v] Moving away from a model of working through international institutions for global health governance, the United States is bypassing multilateral organizations and pursuing a herculean expansion in bilateral health assistance, increasingly making U.S. foreign policy a singular force for global health.[vi] As the largest donor to global health—in absolute dollars, albeit less committed relative to GDP—foreign health assistance is fast becoming an anchor of U.S. soft power – answering the call for global health leadership in a post-Cold War world.[vii] Where once this role was defined by uncoordinated medical approaches to select high-profile diseases, the United States is moving toward coordinated foreign assistance to public health systems. With U.S. health diplomacy once grounded solely in the containment of the Cold War—to combat the “unsatisfactory living conditions on which Communism feeds,” influencing minds as much as bodies[viii]—the 1961 establishment of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) galvanized foreign assistance for public health, administering technical and economic assistance for the provision of health services.[ix] However, even as extended by President Bush’s 2003 Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), these ambitious global health commitments would be criticized for excessive reliance on medical services and for “crowding out” public health systems in the developing world.[x] In spite of burgeoning efforts to address HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, these fragmented U.S. efforts continued to lack coordination across government agencies, attention to health systems, and strategy for foreign assistance. But as ethical claims and human rights have renewed attention to the plight of the world’s poor,[xi] the United States has moved to coordinate foreign assistance for global health. Given the need for a comprehensive strategy to govern U.S. engagement with global health[xii]—a need that grew dire as the global financial crisis decimated global health[xiii]—the Institute of Medicine (IOM) recommended that the United States engage more deliberately in global health leadership.[xiv] To reshape foreign health assistance across U.S. agencies, programs, and partners, the Obama Administration’s Global Health Initiative (GHI) seeks to develop a unified global health strategy to integrate and organize U.S. global health efforts. Focusing on public health systems (specifically health financing, information management, and workforce capacity-building institutions)—adding onto existing disease-specific efforts (with 70% of funds earmarked for PEPFAR, notwithstanding a stabilization in HIV funding)—the GHI seeks to shape how the U.S. government coordinates its resources across global health activities and engages with developing countries in meeting nine targets for global health (delineated in figure 1), achieving these targets through seven key principles (delineated in figure 2).[xv] While it is unclear to what extent this foreign policy effort will meet its targets and principles for health system strengthening, preliminary coordination among agencies has begun to identify areas in which the United States could have the greatest sustainable impact on public health outcomes.[xvi] With $63 billion requested for this Initiative over a six year period, the GHI will seek to prioritize country-led efforts to reach the most effective and efficient improvements for public health systems. These changes in U.S. policy will greatly influence disease prevention and health promotion throughout the world, with public health lawyers holding key positions in shaping this policy. With an imperative to create policy frameworks to guide our innovative programs in global health, the need has never been greater to rethink how we in public health law endeavor to meet global health needs – viewing ourselves as key actors in the global health architecture and viewing our work as medicine on a global scale.

#### 2. US leadership solves global disease spread. ONE ‘10

ONE 10 (ONE, advocacy organization committed to the fight against extreme poverty and preventable disease, “American Leadership: A healthier, more prosperous World.” Pg 2) PDF

**Thanks to US leadership**, the tools to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria are affordable, effective, and saving millions of lives each year. Nearly four million Africans—up from 50,000 in 2002—are now receiving antiretroviral treatment for HIV/AIDS. Malaria programs have reached 25 million people with prevention and treatment measures. The Global Fund has also treated more than 7 million people for tuberculosis since 2002. But there’s still much more we must do. In 2008, HIV/AIDS killed 2 million people, 1.4 million in Africa alone. Malaria kills roughly 900,000 people every year—mostly children and pregnant women in sub-Saharan Africa—with 6.7 million people still in need of effective treatment worldwide. And tuberculosis killed nearly 1.3 million people in 2008, with 90 percent of cases affecting the world’s poorest. America’s investments have changed—and saved—millions of lives, one person at a time. This is no time to stop. Every year, nearly 343,000 mothers die giving birth. Most of these women live in the world’s poorest countries. Women in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, stand a 1 in 26 chance of dying during delivery, compared to a 1 in 4,800 chance for a mother in the United States. Investments in maternal health can deliver lifesaving results. If women had access to basic health services—such as a trained health care worker during delivery—80% of maternal deaths could be prevented. A healthy mother also means stronger, more healthy children. Today, 8.8 million children die before their fifth birthday. Pneumonia, diarrhea, malaria and the measles—preventable, treatable diseases that are no longer widespread in the United States—are the leading cause of child mortality worldwide. Children who lose their mothers are 5 times more likely to die in infancy than those who do not. But women who are healthy help ensure that their children attend school, eat as nutritiously as possible, and receive proper immunizations. Through simple, cost-effective means, we’ve helped cut the number of child deaths in half since 1960. We can do it again by 2020.

#### 3. No impact to disease - Extinction genetically impossible and ahistorical. Posner ’05,

Posner 2005 (Richard A., Judge U.S. Court of Appeals 7th Circuit, Professor Chicago School of Law, January 1, 2005, Skeptic, Altadena, CA, Catastrophe: Risk and Response, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html#abstract)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time. That the human race has not yet been destroyed by germs created or made more lethal by modern science, as distinct from completely natural disease agents such as the flu and AIDS viruses, is even less reassuring. We haven't had these products long enough to be able to infer survivability from our experience with them. A recent study suggests that as immunity to smallpox declines because people am no longer being vaccinated against it, monkeypox may evolve into "a successful human pathogen," (9) yet one that vaccination against smallpox would provide at least some protection against; and even before the discovery of the smallpox vaccine, smallpox did not wipe out the human race. What is new is the possibility that science, bypassing evolution, will enable monkeypox to be "juiced up" through gene splicing into a far more lethal pathogen than smallpox ever was.

### AT Heg Bad (Proliferation)

#### 1. We access a larger internal to proliferation ---- hegemony may cause North Korean or Iranian nuclear acquisition but their arsenals are tiny --- their regional disputes with South Korea or Israel are unlikely to risk extinction --- whereas loss of leadership causes global proliferation. Rosen ‘3,

Rosen, 3 (Stephen Peter, PhD from Harvard University in 1979 and is currently the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University, “An Empire, If you Can Keep It,” The National Interest, Spring, LN Academic)

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile**, and be much less afraid** of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of **self-help** in which all states **do what they must to protect themselves.** This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing**, it is not at all clear** that the alternatives are that much more attractive

#### 2. Military readiness controls the internal link. The a subpoint is it’s key to ferretting out and preventing attacks before they happen, even minimizes retaliation. The b subpoint is readiness makes countries more likely to ally with us and less likely to launch a nuclear strike.

#### 3. Heg solves proliferation in general– liberalism and security umbrella. Deudney et. al ’11,

Deudney et. al 2011 (Daniel is associate professor of Political Science at John’s Hopkins University. Edited by Michael Mastanduno, Professor of Government and Dean of Faculty at Dartmouth College, and G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, William Wolforth, the Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, where he teaches in the Department of Government, “Unipolarity and nuclear weapons” International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity pg. 305) BW

The diffusion of nuclear weapons in the international system is significantly entangled with the role of the unipolar hegemonic state. The existence of a unipolar state playing the role of a liberal hegemon has arguably been a major constraint on the rate and extent of proliferation. The extended military alliance system of the United States has been a major reason why many potentially nuclear states have forgone acquisition. Starting with Germany and Japan, and extending to a long list of European and East Asian states, the American alliances are widely understood to provide a “nuclear umbrella.” Overall, without such a state playing this role, proliferation would likely have been much more extensive. The liberal features of the American hegemonic sate also have contributed to constrain the rate and extent of proliferation. American leadership, and the general liberal internationalist vision of law-governed cooperative international politics, both enabled and infuses the non-proliferation regime. Similarly, the robust and inclusive liberal world trading system that has been a distinctive and salient feature of the American liberal hegemonic system offers integrating states paths to secure themselves that make nuclear acquisition less attractive.

### AT Heg Bad (Terrorism)

#### 1. Readiness solves 100% of their impacts and doesn’t link – an active and motivated army is key to deal with small-scale subnational threats and the effectiveness of our military isn’t the what motivates terrorists, it’s the ideological difference.

#### 2. Hegemony deters terrorists ---- decline emboldens them. Walt ’02,

Walt, 2002 (Stephen, professor of international affairs at Harvard, “American Primacy” http://www.nwc .navy.mil/press/review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm)

Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy—and why the United States benefits from its current position—is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion.  When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West’s oil supplies; in 1990–91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the network’s Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker. Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in virtually every part of the world. Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite the “focused enmity” of the United States (to use William Wohlforth’s apt phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist bombings) that do not seriously threaten America’s dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, however, groups opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely.

#### 3. Their evidence is all hype and propaganda – there hasn’t been a real terror threat for years. Friedman ‘6,

Friedman 6 (Ben, PhD student in MIT’s Poli Sci Department, member of the security studies program, February 9, pg. http://www.alternet.org/audits/31514/)

The other reason people overestimate risk is politics. When American assess danger they rely on their perceptions, but they also rely on experts in the news media. Experts, however, have interests and often exaggerate danger to serve them. From government bureaucrats seeking larger budgets, to contractors hawking technology, to congressmen campaigning, danger sells. It delivers money and votes. It also sells newspapers. Reporters report on danger, not its absence. Careerist think tank and academic analysts learn that grants, invitations to Capitol Hill, and jobs are more likely to go to those who trumpet threats and defenses against them than those who tell Americans to worry less. There is a structural tendency in America to exaggerate national security dangers. Despite this threat inflation, spending on homeland security remains tiny compared with defense spending. The homeland security budget for fiscal year (FY) 2006 is $49.9 billion, including the Department of Homeland Security ($42 billion), up from $32 billion in FY 2001. States only spend about $1-2 billion a year on homeland security in addition to federal outlays. Private corporations spend, at most,another $10 billion. In total then, the U.S. spends about $60 annually on homeland security. The defense budget for FY 2006, without the costs of the wars, is $440 billion, an increase of $135 billion over FY 2001. The extra spending goes to weapons and personnel that have little to do with terrorism. Widespread fear of terrorism has primarily benefited the budgets of part of the national security landscape that has the least to do with it.

### AT Heg Bad (War General)

#### 1. Hegemony prevents global nuclear war and checks escalation. Gray ’04,

Gray 2004 - Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, and founded of the National Institute for Public Policy (Colin, “The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the New World Order, pg. 6-10)

Every condition of international order works for the particular benefit of some countries and the interests more that others, and needs defending. The alternatives to an American-led international order are just possibly eventual leadership by some other polity or coalition (probably Chinese, though possibly European, led), or, more likely, a lengthy period with no one wearing the sheriff’s badge. In that unwelcome event, every predatory regional and local power, many a dissatisfied ethnic or religious minority, most probably would chance its arm and seek its own destiny, by violence if need be. Violent struggle is all but essential to the success of the process of nation building. No doubt there are many ways in which order for security, hopefully promoting peace and justice, might be established and maintained. In the life of the modern state’s system, which is to say from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1684 to the present day (though many now proclaim the demise of this system), in practice only one ordering mechanism has been available: the balance of power. The dying embers of that hoary approach limed on even until 1991, when many of its American aficionados could still be found muttering about “the strategic balance,” while through the 1990s many a serious reference still was made to that abominable consequence of Cold War military competition, a condition of stability keyed to the mutuality of assured destruction (MAD). But, today there is no strategic balance, central or otherwise, and there is no political context of hostility to provide meaning to military rivalry between the United States and the new Russian Federation. There is no balance of power serving as the mainstay, the organizing architecture, of the current world order. What we have instead was flagged in the 1995 as a strong desideratum by the classical historian, Donald Kagan.   What seems to work best, even though imperfectly, is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose.  As written, Kagan’s words could just about fit the folly of the theory of collective security. Of Course, he has no such noble nonsense in mind. What he is saying is that peace has to be kept, actively, and that it is best kept by a preponderance, not by an ever contestable balance, of power. Kagan’s historical judgment will serve as the test for this sermon on security. In principle there is both good and bad news in Kagan’s claim. It is good news that his lifetime’s ruminations on peace and war have yielded definite advice. Many academics would be uncomfortable writing as boldly as does Kagan. The bad news is that to the best of our knowledge, there is no hidden hand of history commanded to ensure that only commercially minded popular democracies shall inherit the mantle of preponderant power. It was never probable, but that power at century’s close might have been Nazi Germany or the USSR. Fortunately, chance favored civilizational merit for once, and the only candidate for sheriff today is the United States, a fact which is our second theme.   The United States is the, indeed is the only, essential protecting power for the current world order.  Again, this is not to be deterministic. Although there are no other bidders for this crown at present, it does not follow that the United States is condemned to play this role. After all, American world leadership in Paris 1919 was succeeded post haste by a scuttle from many potential international obligations. Americans today could elect to withdraw from the outside world, insofar as they could in political-military ways. They would hope that the civilizational offense given by soft power of their now globally beamed culture would not be found unduly provocative abroad. Whether The Great Satan, as Iranian spokespeople have delighted in calling the United States, would be allowed to hunker down in peaceful sanctuary in North America, we should doubt. Still, it could be tried. After September 11, 2001, isolationist sentiment temporarily has lost much of its appeal. We may not be much interested in terrorism, but it would appear that terrorism is interested in us. For good or ill, we are what we are. Exactly what this is has been explained in no uncertain terms by Henry Kissinger in the opening lines of his book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? No prizes are awarded for guessing that his question is strictly rhetorical. Kissinger proclaims that:  At the dawn of the new millennium, the United States is enjoying a preeminence unrivalled by even the greatest empires of the past. From weaponry to entrepreneurship, from science to technology, from higher education to popular culture, America exercises an unparalleled ascendancy around the globe. During the last decade of the twentieth century, America’s preponderant position rendered it the indispensable component of international stability. The condition of unchallenged, indeed unchallengeable, primacy will not endure-it is not strategic history’s “last move”-but while it does the United States is the only candidate for sheriff. If Americans should decline the honor, they are at least uniquely well equipped to ensure that no one else could possibly succeed in that informal office. As Donald Kagan provided our basic text, quoted under the first point above, so it is only fitting that he should also be allowed to sound the warning bell. Kagan advises that:  Unexpected changes and shifts in power are the warp and woof of international history. The current condition of the world, therefore, were war among major powers is hard to conceive because one of them has overwhelming military superiority and no wish to expand, will not last.  Quite so. However, historians, perhaps especially ancient historians, should be expected to take the long view. And in the long view everything crumbles. But a suitable vision for the inspiration of policy, judicious choice of policy goals, and competence in strategy, should allow Americans to prolong their current strategic moment, as a later point makes explicit to be the sheriff of the current world order is a thankless role. American power may be necessary to restore such order as may be restorable, but Americans will not be loved, or even much appreciated, as a consequence. The rest of the world will be envious, fearful, and resentful, all the while seeking to use the leverage of American power for local purposes. There is no term extant that precisely captures the emerging U.S. role as sheriff of world order. For the first time since the mid-1960s, it has begun to be fashionable to refer to American policy and tasks as imperial. Andrew Bacevich, for one thoughtful example, suggest that “the preeminent challenge facing the United States in the twenty-first century is not eradicating terror but managing the informal American empire acquired during the course of the past century.” Empire, imperium even better, and hegemony, for all their popularity and at least partial suitability, carry baggage that can be distracting. Unless we are careful, such concepts themselves become part of the problem in the effort to conduct focused debate on U.S. policy and strategy. Despite the grounds for unease, we cannot deny the reality of common usage. For example, a review essay in Foreign Affairs opens with this claim: “The fact of America’s empire is hardly debated these days.” Allowing for the hyperbole and certain imprecision of meaning, still it is noteworthy that the author, Thomas Donnelly, feels able to make such a bold statement.   I prefer to think of the United States as the sheriff of the current world order, for reasons both of cultural fit concept and of tolerable accuracy. Naturally, this American role is largely self-appointed, though it can enjoy added dignity when it is blessed formally by majority votes in multinational institutions. For example, the Security Council of the United Nations licensed the United States to lead military action against Iraq in 1990-91, while the war against Yugoslavia over its “ethnic cleansing” of Kosovo in 1999 was a collective NATO, though not a UN undertaking. Because world politics comprises a distinctly immature political system, we have to be somewhat relaxed about some of the legal niceties. To call the United States the sheriff of the current world order is both description and prescription. This lawman role derives most essentially from the contemporary distribution of power, which so markedly favors the American superstate. Beyond that derivation, however, the role of sheriff is made easier to sustain by the more or less willing, though variably grudging, acquiescence of most countries.   Sheriff is of course a metaphor. By its use I mean to argue that the United States will act on behalf of others, as well as itself, undertaking some of the tough jobs of international security that no other agent or agency is competent to perform.   The American sheriff serves itself by serving the world selectively. This role requires the clearest of foreign policy explanations, lest it descend into strategic opportunism, or at least appears to do so.   U.S. material and spiritual resources are great, but not inexhaustible. They should not be expended casually in the pursuit of goals of only marginal national interest. Notwithstanding September 11 and its aftermath, the jury is out, and is likely to stay out awhile longer, on whether American society will tolerate the sheriff’s role as specified here, expect in contexts highly specific to obvious American interest. Those contexts may not include some which the world order will need a prudent sheriff to influence coercively (if not necessarily with force).  The United States is not, and should not and cannot be, the world’s policeman vis a vis any and every disturbance. The actions of this American sheriff of order are guided frankly by a national interest discriminator. The U.S. President needs to know: what has happened (or cost, of all kinds, are likely to attach to action, or inaction. If the United States does not serve itself through its peacemaking behavior, its career as sheriff will be brief indeed. Altruism has a thin record in strategic history and, we must assume, an unpromising future. That is just the way it is in world politics. However, if the United States seeks to serve only itself, and rides roughshod over the interests of others, again its career as functional sheriff will be brief. The world at large will discern scant reason to cooperate with the United States, if American statecraft is crassly applied strictly on behalf of narrowly American interests. At the level of principle, if not always in attempted application, some of the critics of American so called unilateralism are correct. The United States often is more powerful when it can act with others. This is not an invariable rule. By extension, when the sheriff departs the town he has cleansed, he wants to leave it in the hands of right-minded and hopefully capable citizens. One of the indispensable keys to success in this emerging era of American guardianship is for the maximum number of countries, and extra-national interests, to believe that the United States is protecting a world order in which they all have a vital, if sometimes differential, stake. People may resent the American sheriff, and naturally be residually suspicious of American motives. But they should be prepared to welcome American ordering activity which benefits all potential victims of disorder. Americans do not need to be loved. It is sufficient to be respected and, perhaps, appreciated for the self-assumed lawman role. The United States has an imperial history, of a sort, but has never acquired much of an imperial mindset. Commentators may discover new forms of imperialism to cover current American attitudes and behavior, and perhaps, but only perhaps, there is some small merit in the exercise. Americans are apt to view the world though missionary lenses. American is an idea, a civilization even (to stretch conceptual domain), rather than just another state. Globalization, beneath the hyperbole, is seen in America and elsewhere as equating approximately with Americanization. Whether or not, or to what extent, that is true is not a prime concern here. Instead, our gaze is fixed upon America’s role as chief protector, guardian, or sheriff of this new world with its globalizing flows of information, people, and goods. First and foremost, the United States is the agent of its own national interest, an interest that Washington, on a prudent day, judges vitally bound up with a particular idea of world order. The national interest discriminator to which reference has been made, allows a fairly reliable four-way categorization of issues. Issues can be of survival character: they can be vital: they can be major: or they can be “other.” Survival issues must be fought for. Vital interests should be defended forcefully. Major interests might possibly be protected militarily. “Other” interests should not attract the U.S. cavalry – unless, that is, the cost is believed to be extraordinarily low (but beware of the surprise that friction and chance in war may throw your way.) The political context, or perhaps the timing, may multiply the significance of matters that otherwise would be of little concern to Washington (e.g. almost anything in the Balkans). A useful approach to understanding the U.S. role as sheriff is by means of another four-way split. Given the contemporary, and at least short-term predictable, distribution of power (which admittedly is different in its political-military, economic, and cultural dimensions), the objectively desirable U.S. role typically is as plain as it is not yet acceptable politically to proclaim out loud. With respect to protecting the world order, my seconf four-way split, tied inalienably to the four-way national interest discriminator, is the following: There are problems that only the United States can address in hopes of achieving decisive success; there are problems that the United States should stand a reasonable prospect of meeting and at least alleviating; there are problems concerning which the United States should be expected to fare poorly; and finally, there are problems that the United States has absolutely no plausible prospect whatsoever of alleviating, let alone of resolving (e.g., resucuing and restoring certain failed states). It may be needless to add that in most cases the active support of some friends and allies will, on balance, be a significant, though rarely essential, benefit. The United States could pick up its military ball and go home. It could choose to rely for world order on the hidden hand of universal commercial self-interest somewhat guided by such regional and local balances and imbalances of power as may be extant or might emerge. In effect, frequently this would translate as a green light for regional bullies to mark out their territories (and sea space and air space). Thus far, the contemporary United States is showing no persuasive evidence of an inclination to bring itself home as a political military influence. The issue is not whether America’s skills in statescraft are fully adequate for the sheriff role (whose would be?). Rather, it is whether there is to be a sheriff at all. If the United States declines the honor, or takes early retirement, there is no deputy sheriff, waiting, trained and ready for promotion. Furthermore, there is no world-ordering mechanism worthy of the name which could substitute for the authority and strength of the American Superpower. At present there is no central axis of a balance of power to keep order, while the regional balances in the Middle East and South and East Asia are as likely to provoke as to cool conflict – and conflict with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at that.

#### 2. Readiness controls the internal link – strong, active US military solves conflicts before they escalate and encourages nations not to go to war in order to gain US support. And, even if conflicts occur, they’re decided quickly in favor of whichever side the US chooses.

#### (Prolif Answers also apply – they control the internal link into conflict escalation)